

Financial stability analytics

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Financial Stability

Financial stability as a **public good**

- Liquidity as an emergent phenomenon
- Risk management fallacy of composition
- Deadweight costs of bankruptcy

Crises and lessons learned – Flood (2014)

- Panic of 1907 → Federal Reserve
- Great Depression → FDIC
- Great Depression → SEC
- Great Depression → Bank of Canada
- Global Financial Crisis → FSOC
- Global Financial Crisis → OFR
- Global Financial Crisis → FCA (U.K.)

Plus ça change ...

- The Panic of 2007 as an old-fashioned (shadow) bank run – Gorton (2010)
- This Time is Different – Reinhart and Rogoff (2009)

Panic of 1907 on Wall St.




Image: Smithsonian

What is systemic risk?

- Two general approaches to a definition
 - Focus on the **real economy**
 - Systemic risk is a threat to financial stability “so widespread that it impairs the functioning of a financial system to the point where **economic growth and welfare suffer materially**”
 - European Central Bank (2010, p.138)
 - Focus on the **financial sector**
 - Systemic risk is “the potential for widespread financial externalities—whether from corrections in asset valuations, asset fire sales, or other forms of contagion—to amplify financial shocks and in extreme cases **disrupt financial intermediation**”
 - Adrian, Covitz and Liang (2015)

What is systemic risk?

- **Mechanisms of systemic risk**
 - Global imbalances
 - [Caballero and Krishnamurthy \(2009\)](#)
 - Correlated exposures
 - [Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson \(2017\)](#)
 - Spillovers to the real economy
 - [Group of Ten \(2001\)](#)
 - Information disruptions
 - [Mishkin \(2007\)](#)
 - Feedback behavior
 - [Kapadia, Drehmann, Elliott, and Sterne \(2009\)](#)
 - Asset bubbles
 - [Brunnermeier, Rother and Schnabel \(2019\)](#)
 - Contagion
 - [Martínez-Jaramillo, Pérez Pérez, Avila Embriz, and López Gallo Dey \(2010\)](#)
 - Negative externalities
 - [Financial Stability Board \(2009\)](#)

Diversity of the problem

- **Sources**
 - **Securitization / shadow banking** (2007-09 Financial Crisis)
 - **Sovereign debt** (1997 Asian crisis)
 - **Equity market bubble** (1999 tech bubble)
- **Crisis mechanisms**
 - **Credit surprise** (1998 Russian bond default, LTCM)
 - **Market risk** (1973 oil price shock)
 - **Operational event** (2010 flash crash)
 - **Clearing crisis** (1974 Herstatt crisis)
- **Policy responses**
 - **More capital** (Basel III – Common Equity Tier 1)
 - **Liquidity reserves** (Basel III – NSFR, HQLA)
 - **Greater disclosure** (CCAR/DFAST stress-test data)
 - **Rapid resolution** (Qualified Financial Contracts, living wills)

All models are wrong, but some are useful...

Classifying the literature – Four taxonomies – Bisias, et al. (2012)

• Supervisory scope

- Microprudential
 - Securities & commodities
 - Banking & housing
 - Insurance & pensions
 - General applications
- Macroprudential

• Research method


- Probability-distribution measures
- Contingent claims and default measures
- Illiquidity
- Network analysis
- Macroeconomic measures

• Data requirements

- Macroeconomic measures
- Granular foundations and network measures
- Forward-looking risk measures
- Stress-test measures
- Cross-sectional measures
- Illiquidity and insolvency

Annual scholarly publications, 2005-2018

financial "systemic risk"



• Event / decision time horizon

- Ex-ante
 - Early warning
 - Counterfactual simulation & stress testing
- Contemporaneous
 - Fragility
 - Crisis monitoring
- Ex-post
 - Forensic
 - Orderly resolution

Policy implications

Statistical challenges

- **Very** noisy signal environment
 - “Are Home Prices the Next Bubble?” – [McCarthy and Peach \(2004\)](#)
“... market fundamentals are strong enough to explain the recent path of home prices and that no bubble exists”
 - Fed Bluebook forecast of real GDP as of June 2008 – [FOMC \(2008\)](#)
+2.0 to +2.8% annually




Image: [Federal Reserve](#)

Policy implications

Statistical challenges

- Endogenous policy response to systemic developments
 - “Greenspan Put” (asymmetric liquidity provision in response to stress)
 - Counterfactuals are not measurable
- And endogenous systemic response to policy developments:
 - “Any observed statistical regularity will tend to collapse once pressure is placed upon it for control purposes” – [Goodhart’s Law \(1975\)](#)
 - “Any change in policy will systematically alter the structure of econometric models” – [Lucas Critique \(1976\)](#)
- “Maginot” problem:
 - No single measure is sufficient
- Nonstationarity in the statistical regime
 - Crisis correlations
 - Flight to quality forces $\rho \approx 1.0$
 - Volatility paradox
 - Low market volatility masks risk accumulation
 - Revealed loss surprises
 - Ex ante, crisis is a low probability event




Image: [OFR](#)

The big (data) picture

Rise of shadow banking

- Traditional intermediation (banking) **drops in half 1950–2018**
 - Introduction of option pricing in the 1970s
 - Introduction of collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs) in the 1980s

Bank-centric blind spots

- Banks are only half the story
- Shadow banking is the rest

Accounting blind spots


- Historical view
- Monovalent metrics

Contract (network) focus

- Interactions and contagion
- Risk diversity

Data scalability

- Rise of fintech



Trends in credit intermediation, 1952–2017

Big data and financial stability monitoring

Big data is a *scalability problem*

- Fundamentally issues of **implementation**
“You can’t solve exponential problems with linear solutions”
– Prof. Banny Banerjee
- Problem contains seeds of its own solution
Fight computation with computation

The Four Vs of big-data scalability challenges

- **Volume** – sentiment analysis
- **Velocity** – high-frequency trading
- **Variety** – legal entity identifier
- **Veracity** – raw quote/transaction feeds

Big data and financial stability monitoring

Five Tasks – Flood, Jagadish and Raschid (2016)



1. **System Instrumentation and Data Acquisition**
2. **Data Cleaning and Data Quality**
3. **Data Integration and Representation**
4. **Data Modeling and Analysis**
5. **Data Sharing and Transparency**

Systems Instrumentation and Data Acquisition

Resolution enhancement in four dimensions

- **Coverage** – where are our blind spots?
 - Example: G20 Data Gaps Initiative, [FSB-IMF \(2015\)](#)
- **Frequency** – temporal resolution requirements and limits
 - Example: High frequency trading time stamps, [Lombardi \(2015\)](#)
- **Granularity** – aggregation level (over database rows)
 - Example: Bucketing portfolio risk exposures, [Flood & Monin \(2016\)](#)
- **Detail** – measured and derived attributes (database columns)
 - Example: Fat regression problem ($P \gg N$), [Donoho & Stodden \(2006\)](#)

Information acquisition granularity – Example

Risk-measurement bucketing

- Form PF records risk exposures for private funds (e.g., hedge funds)
- Risk statistics for various sub-portfolios




Image: [Flood and Monin \(2016\)](#)

Is the bucketing too coarse?

Measure a vector of risk attributes:

$$R = [R_{PF} \mid R^+]$$



- R = everything you want to know
- R_{PF} = captured on Form PF
- R^+ = everything else (unmeasured)

Fully granular transparency can reveal a very different risk picture

Data cleaning/quality – Example

Mortgage foreclosure scandal

- Post-crisis explosion of foreclosures



Overwhelmed financial processes in history



- Civil War Greenbacks, 1863
- Paperwork Crisis of 1968
- CDS backlog of 2005

Images: Toles, Washington Post; [Flood, Mendelowitz and Nichols \(2013\)](#)

Data Integration – Example

The **global legal entity identifier (LEI)** minimizes confusion:

- Centralizes basic public facts
- Standardizes the representation



OFR and NIST funded a set of public challenges:

- **Financial Entity Identification and Information Integration (FEIII)**

Traditional risk measurement


Firm accounting statements

Highly standardized

- FASB
- GAAP
- Basel capital rules

Backward looking

- Historical/fair value
- Monovalent




Market transaction data

Pre-trade transparency

- Quotes and spreads
- Limit orders

Post-trade transparency


- Transaction prices
- Volumes




Taxonomy of key information structures

The *Four Ls* of systemic risk – [Billio, et al. \(2012\)](#)


Leverage




Losses



Linkages



Liquidity



Leverage Cycle

Minsky (1977) moments

- Marginal buyer is the most optimistic buyer
- Speculators' access to leverage drives price cycles

Housing Leverage Cycle Margins Offered (Down Payment Required) and Housing Prices





Image: [Fostel and Geanakoplos \(2014\)](#)


Linkage complexity in bank holding companies (BHCs)

BHCs have complex internal structure

- Focus on ownership/control hierarchies




- Graph quotienting exposes dependencies as cycles



We have the data

- FR Y-10 reports
- FFIEC / NIC

Wells Fargo, 2006 & 2010



Images: [Flood, et al. \(2017\)](#)

Fundamental Rule of Data Collection


Endogenous Myopia

- Firms' visibility into their networks
 - Distance ≤ 1 contractual link
 - Position information is closely held
- Implies a role for public supervision

State-dependent data requirements

- Supervisory needs increase under
 - Crisis monitoring
 - Failure resolution
 - Forensic investigation

**System-wide
Data Collection**



Requires

Data Standards

Reading Suggestions

- D. Acemoglu, A. Ozdaglar, and A. Tahbaz-Salehi (2015), “[Systemic Risk and Stability in Financial Networks](#),” *American Economic Review*, 105(2), 564–608.
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- G. Gorton and E. Tallman (2018) [Fighting Financial Crises: Learning from the Past](#), U. of Chicago Press.
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- C. Reinhart and K. Rogoff (2011) [This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly](#), Princeton U. Press.

Thanks!