

CEMLA – FIGI - WorldBank Financial Sector Cyber Resilience Workshop

Session VII - Enhancing financial sector resilience — exercising, mapping and collaboration



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Exercise Experience

- Participated or lead countless continuity exercises for various systems / processes such as CLS, LVPS, Continuity of Operations, Telecom failures, etc.
- Designed and lead texts of manual contingency capability assessments
- Played an integral role in the design and execution of Canada's largest critical-finance sector systemic-level operational resilience exercise which focused on escalation, coordination, and communication within the financial sector.
- Design-team member on the G7 Cyber Expert Group Cross Boarder Contingency Exercise
- Adviser on the Bank of Canada's "Resiliency in the Wholesale Payments System" Project




Personal Learnings from Designing Exercises






Defining the Objective






Environment Scan: Canadian Wholesale Payment Context






Environment Scan: Canadian Wholesale Payment Context






Environment System Scan: Canadian Wholesale Payment Context





Environment Stakeholder Scan: Canadian Context – Federal Level





Environment Process Scan:

Processes with the system

Technical

Prevention and recovery of computer systems

Operations

Continuity and manual processing

Crisis Coordination

Information exchange, resource deployment

Communications

Call trees, Coordinated Public Messaging

Tail-end

Post mortem, regulatory changes, legal actions



Environment Threat Scan:











Conducting Exercises: Design





Objectives not Scenario

THIS

Environment scan shows:

Manual contingency capacities are inconsistent among participants.

Uncertain long term viability of manual operations.

Objective:

Test RTGS participants ability to send / receive 100% of payment volumes after a SIB has been disabled by a destructive cyber attack and has implemented manual contingency. Recovery times anticipated to be 48 hours.

NOT THIS



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Objective:

Test the wholesale payments environment to a destructive cyber attack.



Audience / Participants / Design Team

Audience

Receives the exercise after action reports



Participants

Receives engage with the exercise, respond to injects




Design Team

Design the exercise with objectives, audience, and participants in mind





Type of Exercise





Size and Scope Changes

Don't





Success

Move away from Pass / Fail

Focus on Areas for Improvement



Risk Factors

- Human nature
- Resource constraints
- Objectives are too ambiguous
- Have not dealt with the previous exercise lessons learned
- Suspension of disbelief
- Halo effect from past success / performance
- Failing to get stakeholder buy-in
- Budget constraints
- External coordination



Thank you

